Medieval gangsters
The godfathers of the Wars of the Roses
Lately, I discussed with a good friend if the wars between York and Lancaster were similar to the mob wars run by ‘bosses’ who used their influence and muscle to illegally shape national politics? My response was that I thought everyone knew that the mafia was based on medieval feudalism? Meaning that the structure of traditional ‘mafia families’ was born out of the sudden transition from feudalism to capitalism.
If the ‘bosses’ were the leading nobles in the Wars of the Roses and the feudal structure under them was their muscle then this theory, I think, carries considerable weight. However, there is some disagreement with such left-field thinking. So, I thought I might explain the genesis of the Wars of the Roses so you can judge for yourselves if the notable ’whackings’ of the period were, in fact, enforced murders.
Here is my take on the lead up to the First Battle of St Albans in 1455 and the story of two members of the medieval aristocracy who are generally side-tracked whenever the dukes of York and Somerset are directly blamed for the conflict.
Get ready for lots of names and a longer than average read with no pictures!
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Any serious study of the Wars of the Roses must also take into account the effects of local feuding that had become widespread in some parts of England during the early 1450s. Indeed, it can be said that the First Battle of St Albans in 1455 was primarily a continuation of hostilities between the Neville and Percy families and that the dukes of York and Somerset were drawn into a conflict initially started by them. Historians widely accept this hypothesis, but it can also be argued that other nobles and their adherents paved the way for factionalism to occur on a much more dangerous scale immediately prior to open warfare. In particular, the two lords who were chiefly responsible for the Yorkshire risings of 1453 (Henry Holand, Duke of Exeter, and the violent and extremely unpredictable Thomas Percy, Lord Egremont) fuelled the fires of discontent that created division in England that surpassed even their superiors. This lesser union was primarily influenced by the Percys, which brought about the alliance of Neville and York and led to the murder of the Duke of Somerset, the Earl of Northumberland, Lord Clifford and others in the streets of St Albans.
Neither the Duke of Exeter nor Lord Egremont fought at the first battle of St Albans. But it was chiefly their actions in the north and the way the Nevilles were overprotected by York (in his official capacity as Protector) that caused a Yorkist split following the release of the Duke of Somerset from the Tower in March 1455. However, it was certainly not the case that the Nevilles automatically sided with their cousin York against Somerset or that the house of Percy supported the king purely out of loyalty or hatred of the Nevilles. Rather it was a series of complex connections and events prior to this that brought about the Yorkist alliance of 1455 and, in time, the formation of the Lancastrian party, which opposed it in the civil wars of 1459.
Rekindled immediately after the war with Scotland in 1448, the relationship between Neville and Percy slowly deteriorated when the balance of power was influenced, not for the first time in history, by who commanded the northern marches. However, the real danger to Neville and Percy rivalry came from an unexpected quarter, and this new breed of ‘gangsterism’ had its roots in the younger members of both families. Contrary to popular opinion, the resulting northern blood feud only erupted after 1453 chiefly due to the Nevilles who managed to outstrip the Percys wealth, power and favour in Yorkshire to such an extent that the latter had to resort to violence to survive.
Before 1453, local rivalries between the two families had existed for several generations. Still, open violence had not been actively pursued chiefly due to the demise of Percy autonomy during the reign of Henry IV. Crucially, violence escalated at St Albans in 1455, when the Percys and their adherents fell foul of a supreme bout of Neville bitterness. Indeed, the resulting vendetta proved to be so intense and prejudiced that the same family quarrel was not fully settled until the Earl of Warwick was killed at the Battle of Barnet in 1471.
Prior to 1450, both families had been forced into co-operating against Scottish raiding, and on numerous occasions, local rivalries had been set aside in favour of joint action against the common foe. Border warfare of this kind was intermittent and primarily seasonal, but full-scale battles had been fought throughout the medieval period with the Scots; thus, members of the northern aristocracy had been periodically appointed Wardens of the Marches to combat against this threat to the border. Ever since the time of Hotspur and his father Henry Percy, the first Earl of Northumberland, peace treaties with the Scots had rarely been taken seriously, but the Warden’s office, permanently instigated in the reign of Richard II, was coveted as a means to establish power not only in the north but also in the king’s council. It was crucial that the reigning monarch could count on his northern lords and their retainers to support the existing infrastructure of border recruitment to combat Scot’s invasions of England. However, the disgrace of the Percys in 1403 and 1405, along with the disaster of Northumberland’s death at the Battle of Bramham Moor in 1408, had crippled Percy fortunes significantly. In short, it was some years before Hotspur’s son could achieve anything like his grandfather’s supremacy in the north, and it was no accident that by the time the second Earl of Northumberland recovered his title in 1416, the Nevilles had equalled, if not surpassed, the Percy achievement.
However, when Ralph Neville, Earl of Westmoreland, died in 1425, the contest for territory had become not only a Neville and Percy issue but also an internal power struggle that the Earl of Salisbury set about pursuing within his own family. In fact, while the Nevilles were at odds with each other from within, Northumberland was also busy making enemies elsewhere in Yorkshire. For example, Archbishop Kemp was determined to extend his secular rights into Percy territory, and fighting soon broke out between the retainers of both sides in 1441 and 1447. The irony of these particular bouts of violence was that during the 1440s, it was not only the Nevilles and Percys who were pursuing each other in Yorkshire but also other nobles wishing to capitalise on the two ‘godfathers’ territorial instability.
All this changed in 1453 when the Percys, still struggling to rehabilitate themselves after the attainder and disgrace of the first earl, were irreverently pushed aside by a sudden bout of Neville aggrandisement. A rapid deterioration in relationships caused by a disparity in wealth, plus the fact that the Nevilles had far stronger connections, had an enormous effect on Percy fortunes, and as discussed, it forced the younger members of Northumberland’s family over the edge.
How had the Earl of Salisbury managed to achieve all this enmity in such a short space of time? Evidently, it had been the result of extending his northern domains at the expense of others and by procuring many lucrative marriages and positions for his relatives, offspring, and retainers. In short, the Nevilles had succeeded where the Percys had failed. They had entered the medieval property and marriage market in a big way, and once established, they began to extend their hold over their rivals with unforgiving precision.
George Neville, for example, had been married to a northern heiress and had succeeded to the barony of Latimer, which boasted extensive lands in Richmondshire and Cumberland. William Neville, Lord Fauconberg, a notable veteran of the French wars, had also married an heiress who held estates in Cleveland, and this became another important area of Neville influence in the northeast of England. However, the most important position of power had been attained by another of Salisbury’s four brothers. Robert Neville was installed as Bishop of Durham in 1438, and in his official capacity, he was able to put the resources of his palatinate at Salisbury’s disposal whenever the need arose. Add to this the fact that Edward Neville, Lord Abergavenny, through his marriage into the Beauchamp family, had also secured his family a tenuous foothold in Wales, and it only remained for Salisbury to manufacture for his son Richard the grand prize of the Warwick inheritance to make the Neville achievement complete. By 1449 when Richard Neville gained this earldom, Salisbury’s family owned vast tracts of land between the Pennines and the east coast of Yorkshire. No wonder the Percys stood in awe of the Neville hegemony.
As might be expected, along with all these new lucrative titles and estates came an extensive network of dependents and retainers all willing to give faithful service to a good lord who could maintain them in the law courts and, if need be, on the battlefield. With such territorial advantage and willing manpower at his fingertips, it was evidently Salisbury’s intention to make the wardenship of the West March hereditary and thereby control the Scots border himself. It was a situation that was bound to cause conflict in the end, and in answer to his overmighty behaviour, the younger Percys lashed out in a spate of organised crime that took the Nevilles completely by surprise. The local anarchy that resulted was to have far-reaching effects, especially when the most menacing of the Percy ‘pride of lions’ was let loose on its unsuspecting prey.
Born in 1422, Thomas Percy, Lord Egremont epitomised the problem of a younger son with no lucrative heiress to enhance his wealth and status. The result was that he had become a charge on his father’s estates with little or no chance of advancement. Wild, troublesome and violent, Egremont was nonetheless determined to shake off his father’s yolk by setting himself on a course of reckless self-aggrandisement that proved fatal for everyone. Soon after returning home from the war with Scotland, he began to assemble a band of ruffians to hasten conflict with the Nevilles and to further annoy the younger members of Salisbury’s family, he began to distribute his livery of red and black to any man who was willing to help him.
In direct opposition to the Nevilles authority in the West March, Egremont soon set up his headquarters at Cockermouth, and in 1447 he and his retainers rode south into Neville territory intent on pillage. The result was that he was flung into York prison for disturbing the peace. But when he was released, the situation had got so serious that both feuding families deliberately ignored summonses by the king to muster for service in France in favour of settling their feud in Yorkshire. Not surprisingly, Sir John Neville, Salisbury’s younger son, rose to Egremont’s bait, and in 1453 he raided the Percy lordship of Topcliffe on the pretext of apprehending his opposite number. In reply, Sir Richard Percy, Egremont’s brother, attacked the Neville manors of Halton and Swinden and the resulting spate of raiding caused a complete breakdown of law and order in the north. Troublemakers from all over Yorkshire began to abuse the law while the government was impotent and King Henry was insane. However, the next affront to Neville ascendancy was aimed directly at the Earl of Salisbury and leading members of his family. In fact, it is more than likely that Egremont intended to assassinate the earl in a frenzy of bloodletting that would leave the Percys in full control of the north.
On 24 August 1453, Salisbury, his countess, Sir Thomas Neville and his new bride Maud Stanhope, a niece of Ralph Lord Cromwell, were travelling north from Tattershall Castle in Lincolnshire where the latter had been celebrating their wedding. It was Egremont’s intention to stop them beyond the gates of York, and to this end, he and Sir Richard Percy succeeded in gathering 700 men to block the road at Heworth Moor - a route that the Nevilles had to take to Sherrif Hutton, one of their many castles in North Yorkshire. Lord Cromwell’s willingness to settle the Yorkshire castle of Wressle on the young Neville couple was another affront to the Percy family. Wressle had formerly been a possession of theirs in the reign of Henry IV and clearly a property that they sought to eventually recover as part of their rehabilitation programme. Doubtless, the Earl of Northumberland hoped that the castle would someday be returned to the family by peaceful negotiation, but he clearly did not bargain on two of his sons trying to settle the property dispute by force of arms. The annalist of Whitby Abbey was well placed to report that, ‘there arose a great discord betwixt him [Northumberland] and Richard, the Earl of Salisbury his wife’s brother, insomuch that many men of both parties were beaten and slain.’
After the battle at Heworth Moor, a full-scale inquiry was launched into the incident by the Duke of York, and therefore an accurate picture of a nobles ‘private army’ can be reconstructed prior to the onset of the Wars of the Roses. Names, occupations and an indication of where the accused lived are all recorded, while the detailed information gives the distinct impression that Egremont’s antagonism of the Neville family was certainly well supported by Yorkshiremen, who formed 94% of his force. Approximately 15% of the indicted men were freemen and tradesmen from the city of York, and some willing partisans had come from Doncaster, Scarborough and Hull. As might be expected, most of the Percy manors were well represented in Egremont’s muster, half of those men named being described as yeomen farmers, some from the Percy honour of Cockermouth in Cumberland who had followed Egremont’s lead since 1447. Outside the Percy sphere of influence, a handful of sympathisers from Lincolnshire, Westmoreland and Lancashire had decided to join him, while mariners and chapmen had been recruited from Scarborough, Hull and Whitby, the result being that a diverse and largely untrained army was at Egremont’s disposal. Clerics also formed part of the Percy muster, and men like Thomas Colvel, vicar of Topcliffe and William Wood, rector of Leathley, were on hand to provide more ‘spiritual’ support if it was needed.
Egremont’s following may have been ill-disciplined, but it was certainly not an unruly band of thugs spoiling for a fight. The commanders of the army were knights and gentry who were professional soldiers. Most of those named in the indictment were retainers of the Earl of Northumberland, and no doubt Egremont was equally strong in those esquires and gentlemen who owed their landed interest and hence their lives to his father. However, the purely mercenary decision to assassinate leading members of the Neville family was most likely Egremont’s own brainchild, and this is probably why the attack on the Nevilles failed. It is not known how serious the confrontation became, but it is recorded that Sir William Buckton personally attacked the Earl of Salisbury at some point in the skirmishing; therefore, the battle was not an insignificant affair. The Neville wedding party may have been too strong for Egremont’s liking, or another theory runs that his men began fighting with the Nevilles only to withdraw for some reason, probably fearing the consequences of their action. However, whatever the real reason for the Battle of Heworth Moor, this was the first time in their history that Neville and Percy had actually crossed swords, and this time it was a situation that the existing government could not ignore.
Despite vain attempts at mediation between the Nevilles and the Percys, the autumn of 1453 was punctured by several other renewed outbursts of violence, each side turning a deaf ear to royal commands and civic pleadings. As far as both sides were concerned, nothing had been settled at Heworth. Swords had been drawn, men had confronted each other embattled for war, and property had been ransacked to no great advantage. It may have been irresponsible for Lord Egremont to act so foolishly against the Nevilles, but what if much larger political ideals had prompted the Percys to act so confidently in the first place. In short, had the machinations of Henry Holand, Duke of Exeter, been at work in the north much earlier than historians think?
Earlier that year, Lord Cromwell (Neville’s recent benefactor) was involved in a dispute with Lord Grey of Ruthin and Henry Holand, Duke of Exeter, which proved of great importance to how Egremont and the Percys would conduct their war against the Nevilles from then on. Exeter was descended from royal blood, and it is certain that he had ambitions far beyond his means, not to mention his intellect. In 1452 he had claimed two of Cromwell’s manors that were also pursued by Lord Grey, who had a similar entitlement to the same estates. Grey managed to come to a temporary agreement with Cromwell, but Exeter was not a patient man, and he forcibly dispossessed the latter of his manor of Ampthill in Bedfordshire in 1453. The outcome caused another family feud resulting in a stern reprimand from the crown and orders to immediately appear before the king. However, when the respective factions finally arrived in London, their presence was backed by force, each having armed retinues hoping to overawe the court and all three men suffered a spell of imprisonment before being dismissed back to their respective estates. No further action was taken, but it was no accident that the browbeaten Exeter later sought out Lord Egremont and the Percys in a bid to topple Cromwell, their common enemy. Proof of this pact was recorded in an official London newsletter which reported that on 19 January 1454, Lord Egremont and the Duke of Exeter swore an oath of allegiance at Tuxford near Doncaster to further their aims against the Nevilles and anyone else who opposed them. It was the start of the kind of factionalism that later led to the Wars of the Roses.
The historian G.M. Trevelyan remarked that ‘the Wars of the Roses were to a large extent a quarrel between Welsh Marcher Lords, who were also great English nobles, closely related to the English throne.’ This opinion was endorsed by Ralph A. Griffiths, but modified by a more valid observation that if Trevelyan had looked northwards, especially to Yorkshire, ‘he might well have described the Wars of the Roses as in part a quarrel between great Yorkshire magnates who were also involved in a campaign to reform that ultimately displace the Lancastrian government.’ Certainly, the opening skirmishes between the Nevilles and the Percys, which culminated in the First Battle of St Albans, were the model for all confrontations thereafter. Local feuding and rivalry was a problem that had caused division in the past, and with no forceful king to quell instability, this behaviour could only lead to wider rebellion. In fact, on 20 October 1453, after further risings had been staged in Yorkshire, the northern feud reached a new and dangerous height for exactly these reasons.
Prior to the official alliance between Lord Egremont and the Duke of Exeter, a major battle was almost fought near the Percy manor of Topcliffe in North Yorkshire. With Neville and Percy armies numbered in thousands rather than hundreds, the stage had been set for a bloodbath that could have been described, had it occurred, as the first major battle of the Wars of the Roses. Instead, the battle was called off, and both sides agreed to a truce, even though most of the key protagonists had arrived in strength, including the Earl of Warwick, who had accompanied his father Salisbury for the first time. Lord Egremont, who had been supported by Henry, Lord Poynings and Lord Thomas Clifford of Skipton, was no doubt mortified that the confrontation had once again been inconclusive. Like at Heworth, both sides commanded personal armies of well-equipped retainers, their tenants and local town militias, similar to those who would later fight in the Wars of the Roses. Indeed, the very fact that the armies at Topcliffe and Heworth were made up of professional soldiers rather than ill-organized ruffians probably caused commanders to dismiss their armies without major bloodshed. In short, the first battle of the Wars of the Roses had been merely postponed to a later date.
With the king incapacitated, it was the Duke of York’s responsibility, as regent, to put down the northern rebellions and the massive concentration of Percy strength at Spofforth Castle in Yorkshire on 21 May 1454, not to mention the appearance of the Duke of Exeter in the north, prompted York to march from London without delay. However, Exeter and Egremont had already anticipated York’s move against them, and after claiming the Duchy of Lancaster as his own and distributing liveries of red and white to anyone who would follow him, Exeter embarked on a highly dangerous campaign that directly threatened York’s authority as Protector. With Egremont at his side, they both marched on York, then Hull, in an effort to extend their control over Yorkshire. However, it was an enterprise that was doomed to failure primarily due to Exeter’s lack of foresight. Turning west after a failed attempt to seize Hull, the rebels soon dispersed, although a force led by Robert Mauleverer tried to organise opposition against the Duke of York when he entered the county. Caught between Duke Richard with an army in the east and Sir Thomas Stanley in the west, Exeter fled to sanctuary at Westminster where he was advised to submit his ‘grievances’ directly to the king - undoubtedly a petition that he could neither hope to uphold let alone voice. It was left to York, the Nevilles and the justices of the City of York to conclude the rebellion by indicting the main culprits and by placing blame on Exeter and the Percys. Soon after this, the Nevilles moved one step closer to an alliance with the Protector.
It is not surprising that when the duke of York returned to London on 4 July 1454, one of his first tasks was to have Exeter and his bastard brother, Robert, forcibly removed from sanctuary. Immediately conveyed into the north, the renegade duke was imprisoned in Pontefract Castle, where the Earl of Salisbury was ordered to keep a watchful eye on him. As further punishment, Exeter’s claimed manors of Ampthill and Fanhope, fought over so vehemently with Lord Cromwell, were granted to Lord Grey of Ruthin, and it seemed, for the time being, the northern rebellion had been defeated. However, Exeter’s accomplice was not deterred, and in October 1454, Egremont decided to attack the Neville manor of Stamford Bridge near York in the hope of renewing the conflict. The Whitby Cartulary recorded the disaster which befell the Percys when Egremont and his brother Richard Percy, along with two hundred Pocklington men, clashed with Sir Thomas and Sir John Neville. At some point during the raid, the bailiff of Pocklington, Peter Lound, fled with his men leaving Egremont at Neville’s mercy. It was to be the end of Percy’s reign of terror in the north. Unable to pay the vast sum of money owed to the Nevilles in damages (16,800 marks), Egremont was first conveyed to Middleham Castle then to London, where he was imprisoned in Newgate prison for the next two years.
Disorder in the north, and the recent disasters in France, were probably the main cause for the king’s insanity in August 1453. However, when the Duke of York was dismissed as Protector in 1454, the speed at which his enemy Somerset was restored to power was a move by king Henry that was bound to cause a renewed sense of anxiety in the Yorkist camp. The correctness of discharging York from his duties can be understood, but the blatant and imprudent restoration of a former hated minister, rather than giving authority to a third party smacks of an unscrupulous guiding hand behind the throne. Suffice to say, York knew that once released, Somerset would seek his elimination from politics (and the world) as quickly as possible. Only this, and the establishment of a new government, could ensure Somerset’s survival. York’s rival undoubtedly knew that if ever the king had another relapse of his debilitating illness then the same incarceration process, or worse, might befall him if ever York assumed the Protectorship indefinitely.
It would be imprudent to say that York and the Nevilles had not already begun to anticipate what possible moves might be made against them if ever Somerset was released from imprisonment too. However, when the duke was conducted from the Tower on 5 February 1455 York, Salisbury and Warwick seemed manifestly unaware of what measures had been put in place to ensure Somerset’s return to court. Indeed, York and Salisbury were numbered among the attendees of a Great Council meeting that accompanied Somerset’s ‘strange’ release from confinement pending his reply to the accusations that had been laid against him. However, it was small consolation to the Yorkists that Somerset promised never again to involve himself in national politics or approach within twenty miles of the king’s person. One month later, against all the odds, Somerset’s sureties were formally discharged and rather than being constrained, he once again resumed his former place as Henry’s chief minister.
Did the duke of York not anticipate this flagrant breach of faith by the king? Evidently not. In fact, soon after resigning his office as Protector to Henry at Greenwich, it seems as if York and his friends believed that Somerset was actually about to step down from political life. However, the significant change of heart in favour of Somerset that took place on 4 March immediately reversed the fortunes of York and the Nevilles. Evidently, it made them fearful of their lives. The grounds for this sudden apprehension became abundantly clear when two days later, when charges against Somerset had been dropped, the Duke of York was relieved of his Captaincy of Calais and Somerset reinstated in his place. The next day, Salisbury was ordered to resign the Great Seal to Henry VI, and on 15 March, the Earl of Wiltshire, who coincidently had his own grievances against York, was appointed Treasurer. The Lancastrian coup was concluded with the surprising release of the Duke of Exeter from Pontefract Castle on 19 March – a danger that was bound to cause unease in the Neville camp.
Once again, unmistakable signs of victimization were being thrust upon York by a king who had fallen foul of gross manipulation, but who was pulling Henry’s strings while Somerset was incarcerated in the Tower? Certainly prior to becoming regent, York assumed that it was only his rival who was labouring about the king for his undoing. But if so, who had arranged for Somerset to be released from the Tower? Who had canvassed Lancastrian support while king Henry was incapacitated? In short, who had everything to lose if York assumed the Protectorship on a more permanent basis? Clearly, Queen Margaret and her son would suffer if the young prince was ever subjected to a long minority under Yorkist rule, and now that York had allies in his personal vendetta against Somerset, there was no telling where his ambition might lead? It is no surprise that all these accusations formed part of later Yorkist propaganda, but the question of Margaret’s guiding hand behind the throne is inescapable and clearly validated by her later dogged and resourceful involvement in the Wars of the Roses. The fact that the newborn prince had to be protected against any ambitious claimants to the throne was a natural assumption for a French princess to make, and York was clearly regarded as a threat to that succession. Indeed, the fact that Margaret tried to wrest control of the kingdom from the Duke of York immediately after the king became insane is clear from one of the Paston Letters.
Thus Margaret, according to the above evidence, tried to assume the regency herself although when she was forced under York’s control, she could do no other but work secretly for Somerset’s release. When Henry showed signs of improvement, though there is no confirmation that the king was ever completely sane again, the support for Somerset was so overwhelming that it is hard to believe that Margaret had not been active behind the scenes. At a Great Council meeting on the 5 February, only York was overtly hostile to Somerset’s release, which supports the claim that a great deal of work had contributed to his freedom.
With the battle lines now drawn in anger, if not in blood, and King Henry once more back under the queen’s thumb, only one course of action presented itself to York and his Neville allies – Somerset had to be permanently removed from politics. Having withdrawn into the north rather than Ludlow, or another of duke Richard’s many English lordships, the Yorkists immediately began to muster an army. It is highly likely that this recruitment took place in and around Sandal Castle near Wakefield and at Middleham, one of the Neville strongholds in Yorkshire. The court party apparently had no idea of Yorkist preparations at this time, but after York and the Nevilles dispersal from London on 7 March, it is plausible that Somerset and his supporters immediately set about closing ranks around the king to form an inner council that much resembled the buttress to Henry’s throne that had existed in the 1440s.
But was anyone prepared for civil war? Clearly, the court party were dilatory and saw the abrupt disappearance of the Yorkists as more of a political problem rather than a military threat. Instead of a swift campaign to rid the kingdom of ‘northern’ discontent, the official reaction was to summon a council at Leicester, the declared purpose being to provide for the personal safety of the king and the prince of Wales. Messengers were sent out to various shires carrying letters bidding only certain lords and knights attend the meeting. However, York and the Nevilles were not excluded from the Leicester council, therefore it is assumed that the Yorkist lords must have been immediately alerted to the real danger of either being exposed as traitors, or worse, being sought out and assassinated by their enemies.
Proof of a plot to undermine the Yorkist lords at Leicester was later confirmed when news reached them that previously another covert meeting had taken place at Westminster soon after they had left London, to which neither York nor his allies had been invited. In a letter written by York, Salisbury and Warwick to the Chancellor, Archbishop Bourchier, on 20 May 1455 immediately prior to the battle of St Albans, the reference to a secret meeting is abundantly clear. Their ‘mistrust of some persons’ is a feature of the suspicions that York and the Neville must have felt at this time. In fact, it was the main reason why they set about protecting themselves with both men and petitions of loyalty that they hoped to lay before the king.
As it transpired, the Leicester council never met due to the ensuing battle of St Albans, but its formulation was clearly intended to wound York and perhaps even arranged to, yet again, force him into acting inappropriately. The royalist lords and knights may even have been brought together in order to witness yet another humiliating scene of York swearing oaths of loyalty to Henry. However, it is clear that both York and Somerset had already decided what action should be taken, and although the royal reaction was somewhat remiss, the Yorkists had clearly made their minds up to capture (or kill) Somerset before the Leicester meeting could take place.
While York and the Nevilles were recruiting their forces in the north, there was an element of unrest in the south, leading us to believe that Somerset, at least, was preparing for a hostile reaction to his release. According to the Dijon Relation, he had become extremely unpopular in London and fearing that the journey north to Leicester might prove hazardous, he set about making plans to protect the king (and himself) from further molestation. Both the Dijon Relation and a letter to the Archbishop of Ravenna in the Calendar of State Papers in Milan allude to the fact that the royalists were fearful of what York might do next in order to regain authority.
This threat of personal danger caused Somerset, as Constable, to immediately send out summonses in the king’s name for military help, although he must have known that to recruit substantially would be an impossible task given the timing of the meeting at Leicester. However, commissions to raise troops were dispatched from Westminster on 18 May, and it is highly likely that all these hastily raised contingents were called upon to concentrate on St Albans, although the wording of the document alludes to a convergence immediately upon the king’s person wherever he might be.
The summons for military support to Coventry may be typical of what was expected of both town militia and noble retinues at the time. The urgency to send reinforcements is a clear indication that Somerset was desperate for support from almost anywhere in the kingdom, although on receipt of this letter, the exact location of the intended concentration may have been divulged by word of mouth. The council of Coventry, for example, resolved that 100 men should ‘be made ready in all haste possible to go to our sovereign lord to St Albans and to abide with him and to do him service’.
Other noble retinues, including those commanded by the duke of Norfolk, the earls of Oxford and Shrewsbury, Lord Cromwell and Sir Thomas Stanley, were also summoned at roughly the same time. However, it appears that these summonses were either not acted upon speedily enough to meet Somerset’s demands or not heeded purposefully due to wavering loyalties. The question also may be asked, did the royalists know where York and the Nevilles were at the time? And if this was common knowledge, can Somerset and his council be held guilty of gross negligence?
It is known that emissaries from King Henry had already been sent north to the Duke of York soon after his party had quit London. Comprising such worthies as the Bishop of Coventry, the earl of Worcester and the Prior of St John’s, it can be assumed that someone in authority knew York’s approximate location. Indeed, the official attitude to York and the Nevilles abrupt disappearance from court was highly charged and wholly in keeping with Somerset’s worst fears. If previous armed incursions had caused Somerset not to worry unduly, the situation that now presented itself was enough to cause him panic given the fact that York now had Neville backing.
Warned of this threat, on 19 May the Chancellor, Thomas Bourchier was directed to prepare letters addressed to the dukes of York and Norfolk and the earls of Warwick and Salisbury forbidding them to illegally array the king’s subjects. York was ordered to dismiss all but 200 followers as befitting his position, and the other named lords were restricted to 160 each upon risk of forfeiture. Evidently, Somerset was taking what precautions he could at such short notice, using the king’s council to issue the necessary documents. However, the Duke of Buckingham (who was to replace Somerset as Constable at the king’s request immediately prior to the Battle of St Albans) thought the Yorkist threat not overtly hostile. As the senior commander of what soon would transform itself from a king’s household into a royal army, Buckingham may have thought that Somerset’s urgent letters of 18 May to recruit far and wide, slightly paranoid. How wrong he was. The Yorkists were at that moment marching south with an army of northerners hell-bent on Somerset’s demise.
The evidence for the Yorkist march south is imprecise, but like all other medieval marches and recruitment drives, its course is peppered with correspondence, and therefore it can be traced by where messages were initially drafted. While the king and his household were still preparing to leave Westminster, the Yorkists had already gained a great deal of ground, and hence an element of surprise was achieved. In only a few days, they had mustered their northern contingents and had marched down the Great North Road to Royston. Here, on 20 May York, Warwick and Salisbury signed and sealed a letter to the Chancellor, Thomas Bourchier (then Archbishop of Canterbury) that not only protested their continued loyalty toward the king but also declared that they had brought a company of armed followers expressly for the king’s protection. Couched in dutiful and loyal language, they also stated to the Chancellor that he, in his official capacity of archbishop, should publicly excommunicate at St Paul’s Cross all those who mediated harm toward the king. Protesting that they had received no invitation to the recent Westminster council, the Yorkists also questioned the summoning of another council at Leicester and asked why it was convened to provide for the king’s security. If the council mistrusted ‘some persons’, the Yorkists demanded to know who had inspired the king with such mistrust in the first place. The signatories explained that they wished the Chancellor to deliver their message to the king, asking that another council, of their own choosing, be convened where they would undertake to do nothing to solve their private quarrels without proper consent. Bourchier was also asked to plead their cause with the king and instructed to do his duty if he wished to avoid responsibility for anything ‘inconvenient’ that might result from failure to represent the Yorkists fairly. With the probability that his brother Henry, Viscount Bourchier and the latter’s son were among York’s followers encamped at Royston, the anxious Chancellor had no choice but to act as swiftly as possible.
It has never been fully explained why the king never received the above letter and why the premier prelate of England did not act personally on receiving it when expressly asked to do so. However, when the Yorkist proposal eventually arrived at Westminster on 21 May, the court had already left on its progress north and therefore the Chancellor was forced into dispatching a rider after them. This courier was Sir John Say, keeper of the Privy Palace of Westminster and squire of the body to the Duke of York who intercepted the royal progress at Kilburn, four miles distant. At 10 am, he handed the letter to a royal secretary, Thomas Manning, but aside from this fact, it is not certain who then received it. It is probable that it was given to Somerset and that he withheld its contents from the king to protect himself as claimed by the Yorkists thereafter.
The Parliamentary Pardon issued after the Battle of St Albans, clearing the Yorkist lords from all responsibility stated that the king never saw the Yorkist statement and that ‘certain persons’ were to blame for withholding it. However, aside from exposing the already widespread opinion that York and Somerset were mortal enemies, what other harm could the Yorkist letter have done to Somerset, a man with an already besmirched reputation? Surely by now, everyone knew that he and York were enemies? Therefore it is more likely that the dutiful Somerset delivered the letter to King Henry and that nothing whatsoever was concealed from him. It was already well known to the king that the Yorkists posed a threat and that they were marching towards him; that their retinues had been ordered culled to a more appropriate level; that their movements south had been anticipated to coincide with the Leicester council; and that the Duke of York’s prime objective had always been to remove the Duke of Somerset from office. In short, nothing sinister can be attributed to Somerset whatsoever, but what is striking is that the king reserved his opinion on the contents of the letter and it was this, and similar acts of dilatory behaviour by Henry, that proved to be so disastrous to Somerset’s survival.
The next day blood flowed in the streets at St Albans, and the Wars of the Roses began in earnest all because of Yorkshire gangsterism, a government that was unable to control it, and a king whose personal rule was sadly lacking in every respect.
If you would like to read a full account of what happened next, go to my Substack post - Terror in the Streets.
Also, a re-issue of my book ‘The First Battle of St Albans 1455’ will be available later this year from The History Press.